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The Effect of Firm Ownership Structure on Performance: 
A case study of Eastern Europe and Central Asian Countries 
Sisay Menji Bekena 
Abstract 
This paper uses World Bank Enterprise Survey 2009 and 2013 panel data for Central Asia and Eastern Europe to 
estimate the casual effects of firm ownership structure on firm performance measured by the growth rates of sales, 
labor productivity and employment. The study uses treatment effect models to compute the average treatment effects. 
Estimation results using propensity score matching show that on average private firms have sales and employment 
growth rates that are 6 percentage points higher compared to public firms. The effect is statistically significant at 
conventional significance levels. Labor productivity growth is similar across public and private firms. The key 
conditional independence assumption necessary for the validity of the matching models is found to be valid and the 
computed casual effects are consistent across the different treatment effect models. 
1 Introduction 
Firms have various ownership structures which can be categorized into two major groups; 
public and private. Private firms have a concentrated ownership structure. They are owned by one 
or few owners and the owners have strong control over management. Public firms have less 
concentrated ownership with many owners. They usually have corporate governance structure 
whereby ownership and management are separated. Separation of ownership and management in 
public firms limits owners’ ability to influence management decisions resulting in different 
performance levels between public and private firms. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) found that 
concentrated ownership structure leads to higher profits. This performance difference is due to 
differences in ownership structure; private firms are closely managed by their owners while public 
firms are managed by managers who are agents for the owners.  
Varian (1992, p441) claims that agency problem causes “principal-agent problem” 
whereby an inefficient outcome is attained due to the difference in benefits (utilities) of the 
principal (owner) and the agent (manager). Information asymmetries limit owners’ ability to 
control public firms. This arises because managers are better informed about a firm’s potential 
while owners are less informed. This gives managers the upper hand to direct firm resources in a 
way that maximizes their benefits (salaries, bonuses, etc.) instead of the owners’ benefits (Asker, 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 2011).  
2 of 10 
Using 2009 and 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) panel data for Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe, the paper explores the casual effect of firm ownership structure on selected 
performance measures; growth rates of productivity, employment and sales. I will assess whether 
there is a performance difference between similar public firms and private firms and show that 
agency problems lead to lower performance by public firms. This study uses treatment effect 
models, propensity score matching, to estimate average treatment effect of being a public firm. 
Propensity score matching is used to control for possible endogeneity due to non-randomized 
assignment of firms to private and public. Estimation results show that on average private firms 
have 6 percentage points higher sales growth compared to similar public firms. The result is 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Similarly, private firms have, on 
average, 6 percentage points higher employment growth compared to similar public firms. The 
estimated result is also statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Labor 
productivity growth is found to be similar across public and private firms. The estimation results 
are consistent across other treatment effect models that make different assumptions on the 
treatment model. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data followed by discussion of 
the methodology in section 3. Propensity score matching is used to get the causal effect of 
ownership structure on performance. The section explains the rationale for using matching 
methods to control for endogeneity issues that arise due to non-randomized assignment of 
treatment. Discussion of estimation results is presented in the following section. The section also 
discusses the validity of the key assumptions required for consistent estimation. The final section 
concludes the paper by providing policy recommendations. 
2 Data   
I used World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) panel data, for 2009 and 2013, covering 
~1,800 firms across 211 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Some observations were 
                                                 
1 Mongolia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Kyrgyz republic, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Armenia, Serbia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Macedonia, and Estonia 
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excluded from the analysis because of perfect fitting of the probability (probit) model. These 
include firms in five countries (Albania, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia) and firms in 
the real-estate industry. As a result, the whole sample contains 1,472 firms while the matched 
sample uses 1,143 firms. The dependent (treatment) variable is public, which is a binary variable 
with a value of 1 for public firms and 0 otherwise. A frim is public if its shares are traded publicly; 
otherwise it is private. The outcome variables are sales growth, labor productivity growth, and 
employment (permanent labor force) growth. Sales data was available in local currency of the 
respective countries and it was converted to sales in USD using official exchange rate data from 
the World Bank. Growth rates for the growth variables is estimated using the growth rate between 
2009 and 2013. Treatment effects are estimated by comparing the potential outcome means of the 
outcome variables across matched public and private firms. Firms are matched based on size 
(measured by log of sales), industry and country.  
Table 1 compares the average sales, and average growth rates of sales, productivity and 
employment across the matched and whole sample. Average growth rates for sales, labor 
productivity and employment are below zero. For the whole sample, on average sales growth 
declined by 4.4%, productivity declined by 1.8% and employment growth declined by 3.6% 
between 2009 and 2013. Correa, et al (2010) in a World Bank Enterprise note series stated that the 
negative growth rates in the region was due to the global financial crisis. Performance data from 
the WBES shows that firms in the region are showing negative growth rates (World Bank 2017). 
Average growth rates for sales and labor productivity are higher in the matched sample compared 
to the whole sample. This is due to the lower growth rates in the 5 countries dropped from the 
study. For the matched sample sales and labor productivity growth rate is higher for private firms 
compared to public firms. Average labor productivity growth is slightly higher among public firms 
than private firms.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Firms 























Private           
mean 5.18 -1.9 -0.2 -2.8 9.18 -3.3 -1.9 -2.5 
Sd. 24.40 27.4 24.6 19.6 98.40 26.6 24.2 18.7 
N 996 826 825 1,089 1,301 1,093 1,088 1,450 
Public          
mean 9.86 -11.9 1.1 -14.0 11.20 -12.7 -1.0 -12.8 
Sd. 23.70 27.2 25.6 20.1 26.30 26.2 25.2 20.1 
N 147 116 116 150 171 137 137 176 
Total         
mean 5.78 -3.1 -0.1 -4.1 9.41 -4.4 -1.8 -3.6 
Sd. 24.40 27.6 24.7 20.0 92.90 26.7 24.3 19.1 
N 1,143 942 941 1,239 1,472 1,230 1,225 1,626 
3 Methodology 
 I used propensity score matching to estimate the casual effect of firm ownership structure 
on firm performance. Propensity score matching is among the set of treatment effect estimators 
used to measure treatment effect when randomization is not applied during treatment assignment 
(Khandker, Koolwal and Samad 2010). If observations are assigned to treatment and control 
groups without randomization there is high likelihood that outcome variables and the treatment 
assignment are correlated. This results in endogeneity (self–selection) making OLS estimation 
inconsistent. Treatment effect models ensure consistent estimation with non-randomized treatment 
by making outcome variables and treatment independent after conditioning on certain variables. 
Estimation of casual effect by treatment models relies on getting a proper counterfactual. A 
counterfactual is a program participant’s outcome in the absence of the program. Matching 
methods form a counterfactual by estimating the probability of getting treatment conditional on 
variables assumed to affect participation. Average treatment effects (casual effect of treatment) are 
estimated by comparing the difference in the average values of the outcome variables between 
treated and non-treated firms with similar probability of getting treatment.  
Panel structure of the data was used to match firms based on their 2009 covariates; firm 
size (measured by log of sales), industry and country. The outcome variables (sales growth, 
employment growth, and labor productivity growth) were measured using their levels in 2013. 
5 of 10 
Firms are tracked for two years, 2009 and 2013, and observed if there was a difference between 
public and private firms, only firms which maintained their ownership structure during the two 
periods are included in the estimation. Average treatment effect (ATE) on sales growth, labor 
productivity growth, and employment growth was estimated by measuring the average difference 
in potential outcome means between similar public and private firms. To check for robustness, the 
ATE was estimated using other treatment effect methods to see the sensitivity of the results to the 
different assumptions made by the different methods2. In addition, ATE was estimated adding firm 
age as an additional matching variable.  
4 Results 
Consistent estimation of matching methods requires three key assumptions. These are 
overlap (probability of being public firm is different from zero for any firm), conditional 
independence3 and independently and identically distributed sample (i.i.d) (Stata Corp LP 2015). 
Since the data is randomly collected the data generating process ensures i.i.d, but this assumes that 
firms that are removed from the panel because of lack of data or other reasons for both years of 
the panel are absent at random. Overlap property is essential to successfully predict propensity 
scores from the probit model and estimate the ATE. Estimation of the probability model, probit, 
shows the overlap property is valid. This implies that there is no perfect predictor of probability of 
being public. Table 2 in the appendix shows probit estimation results using robust standard errors.  
ATE estimates for sales growth rate show that, on average, public firms’ sales growth is 6 
percentage points less compared to similar private firms. The effect is significant at 1%. Other 
treatment effect models which make different assumptions on the treatment model also give similar 
and significant results as shown4 in Table 2. There is no significant difference between public and 
private firms on labor productivity.  Propensity score matching (PSM) results show that on average 
                                                 
2 Stata treatment effects manual provides brief description on the different assumptions by the different treatment 
effect models (Stata Corp LP 2015 p210-214). 
3 Conditional independence is discussed in the end of the section after results discussion since CI can be tested only 
after estimation. Note that all standard errors shown in the tables are robust standard errors. 
4 Online appendix for the study can be found https://goo.gl/NBDeHK , it contains additional charts and tables 
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public firms are 2 percentage points more productive than similar private firms, but the effect is 
not significant. Similar to sales growth, public firms are found to have significant (1%) and slower 
growth in employment. Baseline estimates show that private firms’ employment growth rate is on 
average 6 percentage points higher than similar public firms. The estimate is statistically 
significant and consistent across other treatment effect models. Figure 2 in the online appendix 
shows scatter plots of the predicted potential outcome effects (POE). 
The statistically significant results of higher sales and employment growth rates of private 
firms compared to similar public firms is consistent with the theoretical predictions5 based on 
principal-agent problem. Having concentrated ownership helps private firms to have more efficient 
management that focuses on ensuring higher performance while agency problem in public firms 
results in sub-optimal performance. The similar labor productivity growth rates among public and 
private firms is not consistent with my initial expectations and requires further studies to explore 
the reason behind the same levels of productivity growth rates between public and private firms.   
Table 2: Average Treatment Effects of performance variables   
Treatment - public firm, matching - firm size (log of sales), industry and country 






-5.89 *** 2.11 -6.27 *** 
(1.742) (3.166) (3.399) 
Nearest neighborhood 
matching 
-10.47 *** -1.36 -8.68 *** 
(3.754) (3.715) (3.049) 
Regression Adjustment -4.22 3.36 -6.82 *** 
(2.669) (2.713) (2.513) 
Inverse probability 
weights (IPW) 
-6.02 *** 2.03 -8.37 *** 
(2.089) (1.970) (1.815) 
Regression Adjustment 
with IPW 
-5.04 * 2.10 -8.15 *** 
(2.704)  (1.970) (1.842) 
Observations 942  941 1070  
Public firms 116  116 132  
Private firms 826  825 938  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01    
                                                 
5 Empirical results also support the claim that principal agent problem leads to low performance by public firms 
compared to private firms. The studies use different performance measures such as investment, profits (Curtiss, 
Raginger and Medonos, 2012; Kapopoulus and Lazaretou, 2007; Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 2011). 
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Conditional independence is a key assumption required for consistency of the results. It 
implies that conditioning on the matching variable (firm size, firm age) firm ownership structure 
is independent of the outcome variables (sales, labor productivity and employment growth) which 
ensures selection on observables. Post estimation test is conducted to check for conditional 
independence (CI). The CI test result in the online appendix in Table 1 show that the conditional 
independence assumption is valid. The validity of the CI assumption can be seen from the balance 
plot in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Treatment effects balance plot based on propensity score matching results  
5 Conclusion 
The study used WBES panel data for 2009 and 2013 for Eastern Europe and Central Asian 
countries to estimate the casual effect of firm ownership on performance. Propensity score 
matching was used to estimate the average treatment effects for sales growth, labor productivity 
growth, employment growth and capacity utilization. Estimation results show that public firms on 
average have lower sales and employment growth rates compared to similar private firms, while 
there was no significance difference between public and private firms on labor productivity 
growth. The estimation results using propensity score matching were consistent across the results 
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estimated to see whether adding firm-age will change the results we get using only firm size, 
industry and country.  Controlling for age it is useful to see if the results seen in the base outcome 
are a result of private firms being young in most soviet era countries. As Table 1 in the appendix 
shows the initial estimates do not change significantly after matching on firm size, industry, 
country and age.   
Countries should focus on improving the corporate governance of public firms to improve 
their performance. Corporate governance reduces agency problems by designing incentives for 
management to take actions that benefit the owners while punishing them when they fail to serve 
those interests. (DeMarzo and Berk 2017) Corporate governance not only ensures that 
management is serving the interests of the owners but also other stakeholders that have interest in 
the firm mainly financers. By ensuring transparency, accountability and proper incentives firm 
owners can reduce agency problems and improve the value of a firm. 
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6 Appendix 
Table 1: Average Treatment Effects including firm age as a matching variable 
ATE estimates matching based on firm size, age, industry and country 
 Sales growth Labor productivity growth Employment growth 
ATE (Average 
treatment effect)   
-5.76*** 5.04 -9.67** 
(1.484) (4.697) (4.254) 
Observations (total) 928 927 1054 
Public firms 112 112 128 
Private firms 816 815 926 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
 
Table 2: Probit regression results for estimation of propensity scores 
Dependent variable: public 
Matching variables (firm size - log(sales), Industry, Country 
Log (Annual sales in USD) 0.159*** (0.0296) 
Industry   
Manufacturing 0.484** (0.206) 
Construction 0.495** (0.227) 
Wholesale-retail -0.171 (0.213) 
Hotels 0.259 (0.292) 
Transport and communication 0.693*** (0.263) 
Country   
Azerbaijan 0.524** (0.253) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.565** (0.227) 
Bulgaria -1.075** (0.450) 
Croatia -0.106 (0.322) 
Czech -0.220 (0.495) 
Estonia 0.449* (0.240) 
Kyrgyzstan 1.081*** (0.293) 
Latvia -1.253*** (0.466) 
Lithuania -0.892* (0.488) 
Macedonia -0.222 (0.222) 
Moldova 0.537*** (0.202) 
Mongolia -0.133 (0.233) 
Montenegro -0.626 (0.531) 
Poland 0.0523 (0.490) 
Romania -0.266 (0.271) 
Constant -3.684*** (0.472) 
N 1143  
Pseudo R-squared 0.174  
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.1 ** p,0.05 *** p<0.01   
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